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While some form of evaluation has always been employed in 
science (e.g. peer review, hiring), formal systems of evaluation of 
research and researchers have recently come to play a more 
prominent role in many countries because of the adoption of new 
models of governance. According to such models, the quality of the 
output of both researchers and their institutions is measured, and 
issues such as eligibility for tenure or the allocation of public 
funding to research institutions crucially depends on the outcomes 
of such measures. However, concerns have been raised over the 
risk that such evaluation may be threatening epistemic pluralism 
by penalizing the existent heterodox schools of thought and 
discouraging the pursuit of new ones. It has been proposed that 
this may happen because of epistemic bias favouring mainstream 
research programmes. In this paper, I claim that (1) epistemic 
pluralism is desirable and should be preserved; (2) formal 
evaluation exercises may threaten epistemic pluralism because 
they may be affected by some form of epistemic bias; therefore, (3) 
to preserve epistemic pluralism, we need some strategy to actively 
dampen epistemic bias. !
Keywords: Economic Epistemology, Epistemic Pluralism, 
Research Policy, Research Evaluation !!!
1. A new governance for research !
At the end of the last Century, many national research and higher 
education systems underwent major reforms toward a new style of 
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a departure from classical government steering by means of 
legislation, prohibitions and regulations and a move towards the 
autonomy and the delegation of responsibilities to institutions of 
higher education [...] Under the new system, intervention is 
restricted to ex-post facto adjustments based on quality 
assessments of results (Kickert 1995, 135). 
This style is inspired by the ideals of New Public Management, that 
prescribes to reproduce quasi-market condition to prompt market-like 
competition in public institutions. As a consequence of this shift, and in 
the name of accountability and efficiency of public expenditure, many 
countries implemented large scale and centralized ex-post research 
evaluation systems (Whitley and Gläser 2007). Rather than merely 
portraying the state of research in a given country, these evaluation 
systems significantly affect it, especially (but not exclusively) in the 
many countries where public funding is based upon their results (Hicks 
2012). Furthermore, some countries implemented centralized and 
formalized procedures to regulate hiring. In the remainder of this article, 
by speaking about formal evaluation I will indicate either these kinds of 
large scale exercises. !
2. The unwelcoming reception of formal evaluation in Italy !
In Italy, formal evaluation has been introduced later than in most Western 
countries. Notably, a National Agency for the Evaluation of Research and 
University System (ANVUR) was founded in 2010, which designed both 
a centralized system to regulate academic recruitment, i.e. the 
Abilitazione Scientifica Nazionale (ASN),  and a nation-wide research 1
assessment, named Valutazione della Qualità della Ricerca (VQR).  The 2
ASN was then taken in charge by the Ministry of Education and 
University, while ANVUR has steered two editions of the VQR, assessing 
research produced through 2004-2010 and through 2011-2014, 
respectively. Motivated by the explicit goal of compensating for late 
implementation, governments are making abundant use of the results of 
such procedures. In particular, the results of VQR have been employed to 
regulate a large share of public funding for universities, as well as for 
other issues that were beyond its original scopes (e.g. to set the standards 
for allowing professors to teach at some PhD-level courses). 
The introduction of those formal evaluation systems by ANVUR raised 
several harsh criticisms. Most of them focused either on the ideological 
roots of evaluation (most notably Pinto 2012), or on technical mistakes  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made by ANVUR (e.g. Banfi and De Nicolao 2013; Baccini 2016). 
However, in this paper we want to highlight another problematic feature 
of formal evaluation systems such as the Italian one. Namely, the risk that 
they could impoverish the epistemic pluralism of scientific communities. 
Some reflections were devoted to this issue by one of the very people 
who designed these formal evaluation, a former member of the ANVUR 
Steering Committee, in a book conceived as a rebuttal of several 
criticisms of formal evaluation (Bonaccorsi 2015; see also Bonaccorsi 
2018). 
Recognizing that some scientific communities, particularly in social 
sciences and humanities, may not share uniform methodological 
standards, Bonaccorsi acknowledges the possibility that evaluation may 
generate epistemic conflicts between different schools of thought that co-
exist within a discipline. Advised by the philosopher Carla Bagnoli, he 
acknowledged the possibility that social mechanisms for value attribution 
may produce what Miranda Fricker (2007) called epistemic injustice 
(Bonaccorsi 2015, 76, fn. 11). 
Notably, in order to introduce the concept of testimonial injustice,  3
Miranda Fricker presented the following example, inspired by a 
discussion with a scientist friend: 
Imagine […] a panel of referees on a science journal who have a 
dogmatic prejudice against a certain research method. It might 
reasonably be complained by a would-be contributor that authors 
who present hypotheses on the basis of the disfavoured method 
receive a prejudicially reduced level of credibility from the panel. 
Thus, the prejudice is such as to generate a genuine testimonial 
injustice. (Fricker 2007, 27) 
However, while Bonaccorsi (2018) explicitly acknowledges and even 
endorses epistemic pluralism (at least in social sciences and humanities), 
he is optimistic that such injustices can be avoided by finding a common 
ground for assessing the research quality across different schools of 
thought. Contrary to his optimism, in this article I claim that epistemic 
pluralism is likely to be compromised by a bias that is rooted in any kind 
of evaluation – but gets amplified when evaluation procedures are highly 
formalized. 
The discussion will proceed as follows: first, I will motivate the claim 
that epistemic pluralism is a desirable feature for the social organization 
of science. Then, I will describe a possible kind of epistemic bias that 
may negatively affect epistemic pluralism and show that it is very likely  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when a speaker is given less epistemic authority than she deserves; and hermeneutical 
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to be at work in all sorts of evaluative practices. Therefore, since even 
informal evaluation might endanger epistemic pluralism, a fortiori 
particular care should be made with formal evaluation. I conclude by 
briefly hinting at some strategy that might be adopted to counter this risk. !
3. Epistemic Pluralism !
3.1. What is Epistemic Pluralism !
In science, the word ‘pluralism’ may refer to many different, if partially 
overlapping, concepts. For instance, we can have the following three 
kinds of pluralist stance: 
a) Ontological pluralism. Contrary to the neo-positivist ideal of 
unifying science by reducing special sciences to physics 
(Oppenheim and Putnam 1958), post-positivist philosophy of 
science argued in favour of a plurality of unreducible ontologies 
(e.g. Fodor 1974; Suppes 1978; Dupré 1993). 
b) Sociological pluralism. Feminist philosophy of science has 
denounced the underrepresentation of some social groups in 
science (e.g. women and ethnic minorities), and argued in favour 
of a more balanced composition, for both epistemological and 
political reasons (Anderson 2015). 
c) Disciplinary pluralism. More recently, some researchers 
compared the scientific productivity of various countries, 
revealing that it was higher in those that diversify their research 
efforts across more domains as opposed to specialising in some 
specific one; therefore, they suggest that national science policy-
making should try to promote a pluralism of domain of inquiries 
(Cimini, Gabrielli, and Sylos Labini 2014). 
Notwithstanding their relevance, the abovementioned kinds of pluralistic 
stances are not addressed in the present discussion. Rather, I focus on a 
fourth variety of pluralism, which I dub epistemic pluralism. My working 
definition is the following: 
epistemic pluralism = the compresence of two or more rival 
schools of thought within a same domain of inquiry. 
Given the lack of undisputable criteria for setting the boundaries between 
‘rival schools of thoughts’, I shall settle for the following stipulation: 
rival schools of thought = distinct research groups who endorse 
conflicting conceptual and/or methodological commitments, but 
whose explanatory scopes are at least partially overlapping – i.e., 
they are competing to explain some shared set of phenomena.  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Usually – though not necessarily – such rivalries are revealed by different 
institutional features such as distinct scientific societies or scientific 
journals for each competing schools of thought, or by pragmatic features 
such as different technical languages (or if you prefer, ontologies) and 
heuristics. Their peculiar disagreement is not much about what they hold 
to be true about the world – members of a same school of thought may 
also disagree on that – but rather about how to verify these truths, i.e. by 
means of which methods, heuristics, models, idealizations. In a nutshell, 
what is at stake here is not the disagreement between specific theories per 
se, but rather between second-order conceptual frameworks – be them 
construed as thought collectives (Fleck 1935), paradigms (Kuhn 
1962/1970), research programs (Lakatos 1970), research traditions 
(Laudan 1977) or something else. To name but a few intuitive examples 
of actual rivalry, think about psychodynamics and cognitive psychology; 
continental and analytic philosophy; neoclassical and heterodox 
economics. 
Is epistemic pluralism desirable for science? If so, in which form? 
Divergent opinions existed in classical 20th century epistemology. 
Notably, describing the convergence on a single paradigm as a 
prerequisite for normal science, Thomas Kuhn (1962/1970) interprets the 
co-existence of rival schools of thought within a same discipline as a cue 
of immature science. However, while his justification for such 
convenience may be regarded as a transcendental argument for endorsing 
epistemic monism on a synchronic plane, his praise of ‘progress through 
revolution’ qualifies him as a supporter of diachronic pluralism (Viola 
2015). Other philosophers held that epistemic pluralism should be 
pursued also on a synchronic plane. Notoriously, Paul Feyerabend (1975) 
argued for a very radical form of pluralism, expressed in the slogan 
‘anything goes’ (see also Kellert, Longino and Waters 2006). However, 
one needs not commit to such radical stances to defend epistemic 
pluralism. More modestly, siding with Lakatos, one can recognize that 
[t]he history of science has been and should be a history of 
competing research programmes (or, if you wish, ‘paradigms’), but 
it has not been and must not become a succession of periods of 
normal science: the sooner the competition starts, the better for 
progress. ‘Theoretical pluralism’ is better than ‘theoretical 
monism’: on this point Popper and Feyerabend are right and Kuhn 
is wrong (Lakatos 1970, 60). 
Epistemic pluralism does not entail antirealism, nor ontological 
irreducible pluralism such as Duprè’s (1993): while being a realist, one 
could still maintain some form of convergent realism (Kellert, Longino 
and Waters 2006), holding that while in the long run the one true 
ontology will be discovered, no option should be foreclosed in advance.  4
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In the following sub-sections, I summarise some discussions concerning 
the desirability of pluralism in social epistemology. Analytical and agent-
based models both seem to speak in favour of epistemic pluralism. 
Nonetheless, since the interpretation of these models is by no means 
straightforward, I will turn to another source for a modest defence of 
pluralism – namely, theoretical arguments based on historical 
considerations. !
3.2. Why Epistemic Pluralism matters #1: economic epistemology !
Starting from the nineties, social epistemologists began to reflect both on 
the desirability of epistemic pluralism and on the conditions that may 
promote or reduce it. An exemplar case of Goldman’s (2011) system-
oriented social epistemology, this literature addresses both normative and 
descriptive concerns. Moreover, it borrows some methods from social 
science – in particular, mathematical and agent-based modelling from 
economics: that is why it gained the label of ‘economic epistemology’ or 
‘economics of scientific knowledge’ (Zamorra-Bonilla 2012). 
Concerning the present discussion, the first milestone was posed by 
Kitcher in his 1990 article The Division of Cognitive Labor. Adopting a 
framework originally elaborated by Peirce (1879), Kitcher envisioned a 
scenario in which a community of scientists, who ought to make a given 
discovery, must choose if and how to split their cognitive efforts between 
two methods, i.e. they must answer the question: how many scientists 
should pursue each method?  5
It is assumed that the probability that each method produces a discovery 
in a given timeframe depends on a return function that is increasing in the 
number of scientists. However, these return functions are concave: 
consequently, while a method M1 may be intrinsically superior to another 
method M2 , overcrowding of the former can make it less efficient than 6
hedging the bets. Therefore, hedging the bets by also having a minority of 
scientists who pursue M2 is wiser than having everybody pursuing M1. 
Kitcher then goes on discussing whether the social reward structure of 
science may be particularly fit for achieving this optimal allocation. 
Strevens (2003) further expands that point by comparing alternative 
reward structures, and claiming that the one that is more likely to sustain  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by building toy-tinkers. While this example does not count as a genuine case of epistemic 
pluralism according to my definition, he specifies that his discussion is meant to refer to 
various kind of ‘cognitive objects’ such as “set of rival theories, research programs, 
methods for approaching a problem, etc.” (Kitcher 1990, 10).
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the optimal allocation of scientists is indeed the actual system, based 
upon the priority rule (first described by Merton 1957), which prescribes 
that only the first one(s) who make a discovery get a prize for it (‘winner 
takes all’). According to Strevens, this is the most rational allocation, 
because nothing would be gained by making the same discovery twice 
(but see §2.4). Nonetheless, Strevens in a later paper (2013) 
acknowledges that this optimistic assessment of the division of cognitive 
labour ‘naturally’ emerging from the adoption of the priority rule may be 
seriously endangered by the presence of herding behaviour. He notices 
that the ‘golden share’ for undertaking the correct scientific project often 
takes a (indeterminately) long time to unfold. Therefore, risk aversion 
might drive scientists to settle for more modest sources of credit, such as 
the recognition of their peers – typically expressed in the form of citation. 
But then, being into a more crowded school of thought make it easier to 
be recognized by a wider number of peers – thus making mainstream 
schools of thought more appealing than it is would be rationally 
desirable. 
Muldoon and Weisberg (2011) refer to these mathematical models as a 
Marginal Contribution/Reward approach, and criticize them for relying 
on controversial assumption (mostly inherited from classical economics: 
see Hands 1997; Mäki 2005; Viola 2015; Fèrnandez-Pinto 2016). 
!
3.3. Why Epistemic Pluralism matters #2: agent-based models !
Instead of these models, Weisberg and Muldoon propose to investigate 
the division of cognitive labour through an agent-based model where the 
agents (scientists) must explore a three-dimensional ‘epistemic 
landscape’, representing the many possible approaches within a scientific 
field (Weisberg and Muldoon 2009). The ‘landscape’ is composed by 
many patches, each one representing a different approach within a given 
domain of inquiry. Some of these patches are higher than others 
(representing more fertile approaches), delineating some ‘hills’ of 
scientific fruitfulness. Agents ought to explore as many patches as they 
can among those whose epistemic significance above 0; to put it bluntly, 
they must climb the hills and its epistemically significant surroundings as 
soon as possible. 
Each agent has only limited information: it only knows the epistemic 
significance of the patch it occupies, as well as that of those adjacent 
patterns that have been already explored by some other agent (i.e., 
scientists left traces of the in form of publications about the patterns they 
explored). However, Weisberg and Muldoon designed two kinds of 
agent , distinguished by different behavioural patterns: followers, who 7
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follow the trails of other agents; and mavericks, who privilege the 
exploration of yet unknown patterns over the known ones. 
Populations made entirely by followers perform worse than those made 
entirely by mavericks, because followers tend to cluster and get stuck in 
low significance regions instead of making brave explorations as 
mavericks do.  However, mixed populations perform even better. 8
Being aware of the high level of abstraction of their model, Weisberg and 
Muldoon refrain from drawing strong lessons out of it. Nonetheless, 
further considering that being a maverick is costlier than being a 
follower, they propose the tentative conclusion that “optimum research 
communities are going to be composed of a healthy number of followers 
with a small number of mavericks” (251). For the sake of the current 
debate, their conclusion can be interpreted as an indirect endorsement of 
epistemic pluralism (represented by the exploration of several patches), 
paired with the suggestion that pluralism is easier to achieve when 
scientists are biased toward the exploration of unknown approaches. 
Other intriguing agent-based simulations with different architectures have 
been proposed, that are either moderately in favour or against synchronic 
epistemic pluralism. In Balietti, Mäs and Helbing’s (2015) model, 
scientists ought to find a scientific truth, represented as a point within a 
bi-dimensional space. Scientists are ‘dragged’ along the space by the 
combined effect of three vectoral forces: first, they are attracted by the 
intrinsic force of the truth-point; second, they are influenced by their 
neighbour colleagues directions, which they mimic, provided that these 
colleagues stand within a given agent’s ‘sensory range’; third, for each 
agent there is some noise, i.e. some random force. According to this 
model, a marked epistemic pluralism – represented by scientists being 
sparsely distributed all over the landscape – hampers progress toward the 
truth because of the lack of forces that are strong enough to prevent self-
reinforcing herding behaviour. In fact, in this scenario noise might 
deviate small clusters of researchers toward the wrong direction, arguably 
representing the self-reinforcement of prejudices held by a sub-
community due to mimicking behaviours. 
Instead, Zollman (2010) argues in favour of transient diversity. He 
models a scientific community as a network of interconnected Bayesians 
who play two-armed bandits. Each arm represents a different scientific 
approach and is characterized by a different payoff distribution. The 
payoff structure, however, is unknown to scientists. Rather, they have 
prior beliefs about which one is the better arm and update them by 
considering both the result of their own choices and those of the scientists  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they are linked with in the network. After testing several kinds of 
networks, Zollman concludes that while networks with less connections 
are slower, they are more reliable in making everyone converge on the 
(objectively) better arm, whereas highly interconnected networks 
sometimes converge on a self-reinforcing consensus over the wrong 
answer. However, a community with stubborn scientists having extreme 
priors will manage to test alternative hypotheses without discarding them 
too soon, and eventually it will converge on the right outcome even in 
highly interconnected networks. Yet, combining extreme priors and low 
interconnections tend to fossilize the disagreement and paralyze various 
clusters of scientists into their prejudice, thus failing to achieve 
consensus. 
All things considered, while both Zollman and Weisberg and Muldoon’s 
models suggest that a certain amount of epistemic pluralism might be 
beneficial (at least in some conditions), prima facie Bailetti and 
colleagues’ model seems to point toward the opposite conclusion. This 
disagreement mainly depends on the different scopes and assumptions 
made by these models. Given that these model assumptions are presently 
“still rather disconnected from the real-world social organization of 
scientific research” (Martini and Fernàndez-Pinto 2016), we would 
refrain from drawing strong conclusion from them. 
!
3.4. Why Epistemic Pluralism matters #3: historical and sociological 
considerations !
Given the uncertainty surrounding the models found in social 
epistemology, my endorsement of epistemic pluralism will mainly bear 
on two more modest epistemological arguments inspired by some simple 
historical and sociological considerations. I dub them the prudence 
argument and the convergence argument and discuss them in turn. 
[Prudence] we cannot reliably foresee which one, among many 
rival schools of thought, is more likely to produce correct or more 
significant findings. 
Often, a school of thought may fail to explain some phenomena which 
are easily accounted by another one. In contrast to what is assumed in 
Kitcher’s (1990) model, the history of science seems to suggest that we 
cannot reliably foresee which school of thought is more likely to produce 
a given answer. This is vividly expressed in the case discussed by 
Zollman (2010), i.e. the discovery that peptic ulcers are caused by the 
helicobacter pylori. In 19th century, two competing hypotheses were 
proposed to explain the disease: the presence of some unobservable 
bacteria and an excess of acid. When in 1954 the prominent 
gastroenterologist Palmer published a study that appeared to demonstrate  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that no bacteria can colonize the human stomach, this was taken as a 
conclusive evidence against the bacterial hypothesis. Sadly, his 
conclusion was unwarranted, since the kind of stain he used to investigate 
the biopsies was ‘blind’ to the H. pylori. It took about thirty years to 
Marshall and Warren to discover that the disease was caused by a 
bacterium. Yet, at first their discovery (yielding them the Nobel for 
Medicine in 2005) was dismissed by the medical community, since 
Palmer’s conclusions had been crystalized into received wisdom among 
the medical community. Fortunately, the frustrated Marshall behaved as 
Zollman’s stubborn scientist, and he himself drank a solution containing 
H. pylori. He manifested the symptoms of the peptic ulcer, and then 
effectively cured himself with an antibiotic, thus convincing his peers. 
Despite this story has a happy ending, Zollman cannot help wondering 
about how many more patients could have been successfully cured if only 
the bacterial hypothesis was not dismissed too soon. And we may also 
ask: how many correct hypotheses could have been overlooked if they 
have had no stubborn advocates such as Marshall? 
Nonetheless, science must not only find truths: indeed, it should find 
significant truths (Kitcher 1993, 94). However, the significance of some 
scientific discoveries (which I take to indicate their potential to contribute 
to social well-being) cannot be unequivocally estimated ex ante, also 
because each piece of the puzzle of science might gain value depending 
on the availability of other pieces. This dynamic character of epistemic 
significance is nicely explored by Avin (2015a, ch. 4).  For instance, Avin 9
stresses how the laser gyroscope, which required advancements in 
engineering and in theoretical physics made in the Sixties in order to be 
built, was only conceivable because of an experiment made in 1913 by 
Georges Sagnac, and published in France, whose original scope was to 
test ether wind. 
Furthermore, many important discoveries in science were not due to 
some specific theory-testing. Rather, many ground-breaking discoveries 
emerged as the unexpected result of some fortuitous event – a 
circumstance for which the word serendipity has been coined. An 
evocative example is the discovery of penicillin: Alexander Fleming 
noticed that the cover of a Petri dish containing bacterial culture had not 
been properly set, and that a mould had grown, killing the bacteria. 
Arfini, Bertolotti and Magnani stress that in order to make a serendipitous 
discovery, it needs to be “not expected, but […] still recognizable, at least 
to certain cognitive systems. Otherwise, it would be pushed aside by 
consciousness”. Since the school of thoughts scaffold scientists’ cognitive 
system, a monopolistic school of thought with an overly restrictive 
ontology might work as a blindfold for some phenomena that are not 
predicted by its ontology. Indeed, according to Kuhn (1962), this is the  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routinely way to deal with anomalies. Kyle Stanford (2015) makes a 
similar point, expressing the worry that the actual structure of science, 
due to the concentration of incentives toward conservative research, 
might make it harder to grasp unconceived alternatives. 
These considerations stress the risks of allowing for the monopoly of a 
single school of thought, thus vindicating a cautionary rationale for 
preserving at least a minimal epistemic pluralism. Lastly, it is worth 
keeping in mind that scientific activity is imbued with tacit knowledge 
(Polanyi 1966). This kind of knowledge is hardly translatable onto 
explicit knowledge; rather, it is usually transmitted through long 
apprenticeship – which is why reading textbooks is not enough to become 
a scientist, but a doctorate or some other equivalent form of 
apprenticeship is in order. Thus, allowing a school of thought to 
completely extinguish likely implies a loss of tacit knowledge – perhaps 
right before the availability of some piece of the puzzle would make it 
priceless: a despisable loss, compared to the relative small price of letting 
some minoritary school of thought continuing its legacy, if just for a few 
stubborn followers. 
[Convergence] if a multiplicity of independent rival schools of 
thought converges on a same result, this result is more reliable. 
Strevens’s (2003) abovementioned defence of the priority rule was based 
upon the assumption that we do not need the same discover to be made 
twice. However, since the reliability of science significantly bears on the 
reproducibility of its findings,  giving no incentives at all for replications 10
is tantamount to deprive science of its antibodies, because scientific 
frauds and mistakes will lurk for longer, and perhaps forever – a topic 
which is daunting for current research (e.g. Ioannidis 2005). 
In particular, the better guarantee for the reliability of (a piece of) 
scientific knowledge comes from the convergence of many independent 
sources (Kosso 1989). Jean Perrin’s discovery of the Avogadro’s number 
counts as an exemplar case of a reliable knowledge, since he “measured 
the same physical quantity in a variety of different ways, thereby 
invoking a variety of different auxiliary theories” (Kosso 1989, 247). 
Given that rival schools of thought employ, by definition (see above), 
different methods for testing scientific statements, it follows that 
whatever scientific theory is deemed true by distinct, even rival schools 
of thought, is ceteris paribus more robustly validated than one that is 
backed solely by the followers of a single school of thought.  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4. Epistemic Bias !
4.1. Why should evaluations be threatening to Epistemic Pluralism? !
Evaluation is usually aimed at measuring the scientific quality of some 
research products and/or of those who produced it. However, provided 
that scientific quality exists, what makes us think that evaluators would 
be able to grasp it objectively, without being affected by their prejudices? 
Even excluding the case of deliberate boycott of rival schools of thought 
by scholars engaged in evaluation procedures, it is well established that 
human beings are prone to many implicit biases. Why then should we 
suppose that scientists are immune to biases when assessing their peers 
and their work? And what happens if such biases are embedded into 
large-scale formal evaluation with profound implications for a national 
scientific environment?  11
Some reflections on biases that may harm epistemic pluralism can be 
found in Donald Gillies’s 2008 book. The book is a critical assessment of 
the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE, recently replaced by Research 
Excellence Framework, REF), whose results have been used to allocate 
public funding for research in the UK. Since RAE was based on peer 
review, Gillies asks: is peer review able to predict which research projects 
are going to bear fruitful results? Were his answer positive, it could be 
reasonable to concentrate many resources to that project, even at the 
expense of other strands. But that seems not to be the case. As he 
summarized in a later article, 
the root of the problem is what I will call researcher narcissism. 
This is a condition, which affects nearly all researchers (including 
the author of the present paper). It consists in an individual 
researcher believing quite strongly that his or her approach to 
research in the field is the best one, and most likely to produce 
good results, while the other approaches are less good and less 
likely to produce any good results (Gillies 2014, 8). 
Gillies adopts a counterfactual strategy to substantiate his scepticism: he 
discusses various historical cases from many fields where peer review 
would have failed to foresee ground-breaking scientific advances: Frege’s 
invention of mathematical logic, Copernicus’s theorisation of 
heliocentrism, Semmelweis’s invention of antisepsis (Gillies 2008, ch. 3), 
James Black’s Nobel-awarding inventions of two important drugs (Gillies 
2014).  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4.2. Is there evidence for Epistemic Bias? !
Despite its intuitive appeal, Gillies’s discussion on researcher narcissism 
is purely speculative. Is there any evidence that such a kind of epistemic 
bias is at play in evaluation? Is it stronger in formal evaluation? To 
address these question, I browsed the literature in several social sciences 
that deal with the presence of biases across three different kinds of 
evaluative practice: peer review, bibliometric evaluations and hiring 
procedures. 
Peer review 
Peer review has been compared to democracy; both have been described 
as “a system full of problems but the least worst we have” (Smith 2006). 
Among these problems, many researchers highlighted many biases that 
compromise the alleged impartiality of the process (see Langfeldt 2006; 
Lee, Sugimoto, Zhang, and Cronin 2013). Nonetheless, few scholars 
specifically addressed the issue of epistemic bias as distinct from other 
biases, also because of the difficulty to disentangle them.  12
If such epistemic bias applies to peer reviewing of scientific articles, 
referees might simply reject papers from rival schools of thought they 
disagree with, or even steer the author toward their own theoretical 
perspective. Might this be the case? 
Some evidence in the literature suggests that the answer might be ‘yes’. 
Mahoney (1977) asked 75 (unaware) referees in experimental psychology 
to review a given manuscript, whose results he slighlty modified, along 
with their interpretation. He found that referees tend to judge more 
positively the manuscripts that show positive results and/or that are in 
line with the theoretical perspectives of the referees. 
However, whereas epistemic bias can exert a significant effect on 
scientific careers by influencing the fate of articles submitted in 
prestigious journals, its role is even more direct when it comes to allocate 
research fund. It is difficult to disagree that funding agencies may affect 
“the cognitive development of science by the structuring of the way in 
which research is done” (Braun 1998, 810; see also Goldman 1999, 257). 
Sadly (for epistemic pluralism), in doing that, they foster conservative 
researches over innovative ones (Braun 1998; see also Berezn 1998). 
Having attended some meetings of panels that ought to adjudicate grants 
on behalf of the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC), 
Travis and Collins (1991) observed that “committee members sometimes  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 Wang & Sandström (2015) tried to overcome this problem by developing a data mining 12
technique to measure the ‘cognitive distance’ between researchers, comparing how much 
both their references and some key term from their abstract overlap. However, their 
measurement conflates the proximity of school of thought with that of topic.
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make decisions based upon their membership in scientific schools of 
thought” (323). 
More recently, Luukkonen (2012) wondered whether ERC panels were 
able to ensure that funds are channelled into “new and promising areas of 
research with more flexibility” (http://erc.europa.eu/mission). Her answer 
was negative: she declared that “despite the ERC’s aims, the peer review 
process in some ways constrains the promotion of truly innovative 
research” (Luukkonen 2012, 11), and she further observes that “[t]hese 
constraints arise from the very essence of peer review, namely, its basic 
function of judging the value of proposed research against current 
knowledge boundaries” (ibid.). 
Bibliometrics 
Prima facie, due to their mathematical format, bibliometric indicators 
might seem good candidates for providing objective measures of research 
quality. They also might be tempting due to their relative 
inexpensiveness, especially in large scale formal evaluation exercises 
where the number of research products to evaluate is high. However, it is 
worth remembering that since most widespread bibliometric indicators 
(e.g. impact factor and h-index, respectively measuring the impact of 
journals and of researchers) are based upon counting citations within peer 
reviewed articles indexed by a given database, they embed and aggregate 
the prejudices of both the referees and the editors of the journals, plus the 
indexing criteria of the database owners. Moreover, bibliometric 
indicators are meant to represent impact, not quality. Whereas sometimes 
impact is considered as a reliable proxy of quality (e.g. in the Italian 
VQR it is done for many scientific fields, especially in hard and life 
sciences), this identification is problematic, as it provides strong 
disincentives to work on mainstream problems and within heterodox 
schools of thought (as documented for instance by Castellani, 
Pontecorvo, and Valente 2016). To understand why this happens, consider 
the following scenario: two papers of comparable quality, P1 and P2, 
provide a relevant insight over a same issue. However, P1 does so from 
the standpoint  of a mainstream school of thought, with huge number of 13
followers, whereas P2 from that of a minor (or yet to exist) school of 
thought, with far less followers. Given the reasonable assumption that the 
segregation between school of thoughts make it relatively less likely that 
some scholar reads (and thus cite) a paper from a rival school of thought, 
all else being equal, the wider audience would boost P1 impact far over 
P2’s – irrespectively of their quality. In Muldoon and Weisberg’s (2009)  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terms, the ‘citation economy’ discourages people from behaving like 
mavericks, because mavericks are arguably less likely to get cited. 
For these and other reasons, many institutions and scientists subscribed 
the San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment, which prescribe 
“not [to] use journal-based metrics, such as Journal Impact Factors, as a 
surrogate measure of the quality of individual research articles, to assess 
an individual scientist’s contributions, or in hiring, promotion, or funding 
decisions” (http://www.ascb.org/dora/). 
Hiring 
Among the various evaluative procedures, comparative evaluations of 
candidates for academic recruitment, as well as procedures assessing their 
eligibility (e.g. the abovementioned ASN in Italy), are possibly the more 
relevant as for epistemic bias due to a path-dependent reinforcing loops. 
In fact, it is very likely that the promoted candidate will oversee judging 
some future candidates, and any epistemic bias will be transmitted to the 
next generation of evaluators – and thus amplified. 
Available literature shows that some biases are indeed at play during 
hiring procedures: for instance, candidates who are someway connected 
with the examiners (e.g. they are co-authors of some articles, or come 
from a same department), are more likely to be hired (e.g. for France see 
Combes, Linnemer, and Visser 2008 and Godechot 2016; for Spain, see 
Zynovieva and Bagues 2015). However, these authors stress that they are 
unable to judge whether this advantage was due to epistemic bias or 
rather to social particularism (such as nepotism).  14
Nonetheless, even social biases may have important epistemic 
consequences. Studying the hiring networks of American research 
institutions in computer sciences, business, and history, Clauset, 
Arbesman, and Larremore (2015) highlighted a very ‘endogamous’ and 
hierarchical structure: on the one hand, most professors (about four out of 
five) obtained their PhD in one of the ‘top’ 25% departments – among 
which further hierarchical layers could be distinguished. On the other 
hand, almost none of those who obtained their PhD in less prestigious 
institutions managed to be hired at the higher-levels. Therefore, they 
conclude that 
the centralized and highly connected positions of higher-prestige 
institutions enable substantial influence, via doctoral placement, 
over the research agendas, research communities, and departmental 
norms throughout a discipline . . . . The close proximity of the core 
to the entire network implies that ideas originating in the high-
prestige core, regardless of their merit, spread more easily through-  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Sandström (2015; see fn. 12).
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-out the discipline, whereas ideas originating from low-prestige 
institutions must filter through many more intermediaries (Clauset 
et al. 2015, 4). 
To sum up, there is moderate evidence that epistemic bias is at play 
within each of the three evaluative activities I have discussed, i.e. peer 
review, bibliometrics, and hiring procedures. A sceptic may still argue 
that this evidence is far from being conclusive. I concede that. However, 
since I think that most researchers would take for granted that epistemic 
bias is at play and significantly distorts evaluations, I claim that the 
burden of disproof is up to the sceptics. Moreover, even if the pluralism-
reducing effect of epistemic bias were moderate in each of the above-
mentioned fields, the cumulative impact may be significant: even though 
being hired were only slightly more difficult if the members of the panel 
are hostile to your school of thought, it does become considerably harder 
if due to the unpopularity of your school of thought you had an hard time 
publishing your papers in high-ranked journals and to get them cited. 
Such a self-reinforcing loop has been reported to affect economics 
schools of thought in the UK: according to Lee, Pham, and Gu (2013), 
twenty years of RAE resulted in the disappearance of heterodox rival 
schools of thought in favour of mainstream economics. 
All things considered, unless and until sceptics succeed in demonstrating 
that epistemic bias is negligible or harmless, there are strong reasons for 
worrying about epistemic bias and for trying to mitigate it. 
!
5. Formal evaluation enhances epistemic bias !
In §3 I have defined epistemic pluralism and argued in favour of at least a 
minimal form of pluralism. Then, in §4 I have introduced and 
substantiated the hypothesis that any kind of evaluative process is prone 
to be affected by epistemic bias, i.e. the evaluators might favour those 
who pursue their same school of thought over those who do not. 
The simplest and most radical solution would be to cease any evaluation. 
Yet, this is hardly a viable option: as far as some finite amount of public 
resources must be allocated, we need some criteria for choosing how to 
allocate them. However, while some form of evaluation is mandatory, 
these forms need not be strong evaluation systems that (a) are steered by 
some rather restricted scientific elite, (b) follow highly formalized rules 
and procedures, and (c) have a straightforward impact on affect funding 
and careers. These are the characteristics of the systems described by 
Hicks (2012), and especially of the Italian systems described in §2. Due 
to their often wide-scope, they make a large use of bibliometry (e.g., in 
Italy bibliometric index have been employed for hard and life sciences) 
or to other highly standardised index and rankings (e.g., in Italy journals 
in social and human sciences have been classified in hierarchical rankings  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for the ASN). According to Whitley (2007, 10), such systems tend to 
impose a standardization and a institutionalization of goals and values to 
a scientific discipline, so that “the diversity of intellectual goals and 
approaches within sciences should decline over time, especially where 
they challenge current orthodoxies”. Eventually, “such reinforcement of 
disciplinary standards and objectives is likely to inhibit the development 
of new fields and goals that transcend current intellectual and 
organisational boundaries by increasing the risks of investing in research 
projects that do not fit within them” (ibid.). 
My hypothesis is that this happens because formal evaluation amplifies 
the epistemic bias already existing in weaker evaluation practices, as well 
as accelerating their pluralism-dampening effects. This is consistent with 
the claim of Bonaccorsi (who recently governed the implementation of 
such procedures in Italy) that formal evaluation systems “ha[ve] the 
effect to foster and catalyze the epistemic reflection of the 
community” (2015, 88, translation is mine). However, Bonaccorsi does 
not side against epistemic pluralism, that he recognizes as a genuine (and 
perhaps even beneficial) feature of social sciences and humanities. He is 
optimistic that epistemic pluralism might be preserved notwithstanding 
epistemic bias, because he deems possible that schools of thought find 
some common ground for bias-free evaluation. Though, on the light of 
the evidence of epistemic bias discussed in §4, it seems much more likely 
that a dominant school of thought will impose its evaluative criteria as a 
common ground, promoting the extinction of scientific minorities (or 
preventing the birth of new ones). This evidence is not conclusive, but is 
likely sufficiently strong to put the burden of proof upon the shoulders of 
those who deem, like Bonaccorsi, that epistemic bias can be made 
consistent with a common ground for evaluation. 
!
6. Some hypotheses for protecting epistemic pluralism from epistemic 
bias !
Possibly, epistemic bias cannot be completely counteracted. However, 
some strategies have been proposed in order to reduce it. Bonaccorsi 
(2015) concedes that if (and only if) a common ground cannot be found 
(and there are reasons to suspect that this will be the norm, rather than the 
exception), members of the evaluative panels must be selected with the 
aim to represent (m)any school(s) of thought. He also stresses the 
importance of a rapid turnover of these panels. 
Drwaing upon research in management studies, Osterloh and Frey (2015) 
endorse a more radical answer to the question “what kind of control is 
suited for science?” They think that both output control, i.e. 
bibliometrics, and process control, i.e. peer review, have too many flaws, 
and produce too many distortions. The only opinion left is input control:  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in their opinion, candidate researchers should undergo a thorough hiring 
procedure, but then, if they get hired, they should be left free to determine 
their agenda by themselves (cf. Gillies 2008). 
As for research grants, it has been proposed to supersede epistemic bias 
by picking at least some of them at random, through a lottery. This 
proposal has been recently detailed by Avin (2015a, 2015b, 2018; see 
also Gillies 2014), who also explained its rationale. To put it shortly: 
research project for grant allocation should be kept short, since long 
projects absorb plenty of time from both those who write and those who 
read them, and yet they fail to overcome the intrinsic unpredictability of 
the projects’ outcome. All proposals of high merit should be funded, just 
as all proposals of low merit should be discarded. This, however, leaves 
out a wide number of proposals of medium merit. Given that noise and 
unpredictability would render finer-grained assessment useless, these 
medium-merit proposals should be placed in a lottery, and the winners 
should be funded. According to Avin, this method might lower the costs 
(especially of time), increase fairness and even make unorthodox ideas 
more easily funded.  15
Other thinkers have recommended to fund people, rather than projects 
(e.g. Berezin 1998) – a proposal that has been considered by many 
institution of the NIH in the US (Kaiser 2014). To begin with, it could be 
wise not to concentrate all the funding into a single agency (Travis and 
Collins 1991): as reported by Whitley (2007), diversification of funding 
sources might soften the effects of formal evaluation systems. 
Be as it may, the arguably most efficient strategy for slowing down the 
effects of epistemic bias, thereby preserving epistemic pluralism, is that 
of inverting the actual trend of concentrating resources in the hands of 
few researchers at the expenses of the many (Sylos Labini 2016). This 
might also be achieved by mitigating the use of formal evaluation in 
allocating funds, or simply by doing without them altogether.  16
The assessment of the merits and flaws of these and other proposals 
would require a thoroughly discussion based on empirical analyses that 
also takes into account contextual information. Obviously, such an 
endeavour lies beyond the purpose of the present article. Hopefully, such 
an assessment would take benefit from a careful and well informed public  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grants (the Health Research Council of New Zealand's “Explorer Grants", New Zealand's 
Science for Technology Innovation “Seed Projects" and the Volkswagen Foundation's 
“Experiment!” grants). However, their implementation is too recent to assess the efficacy 
of the policy.
 This might also lead to considerable savings: Geuna and Piolatto (2016) estimate that, 16
all things considered, UK spent around 88.5 million € for RAE 2008, and are spending 
from 130 up to 164 million € for REF 2014, while Italy will spend about 70 million € for 
the second edition of VQR.
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debate. Prompting it is the aim of this article. !!!!
Acknowledgments 
The author thanks the many people who provided insightful comments on 
earlier versions of this paper: Selene Arfini, Alberto Baccini, Raffaele 
Caterina, Carlo Debernardi, Giuseppe De Nicolao, Paola Galimberti, 
Alex Gillett, Eugenio Petrovich, Francesco Sylos Labini, Silvia Tossut, 
and the anonymous reviewers. The author is also grateful to Matteo Pinna 
Pintor for the proofreading, as well as for some interesting comments. !!!!
REFERENCES 
!
Anderson, E. 2015. Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edited by Edward N. 
Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/. 
Arfini, S., Bertolotti, T. and Magnani, L. 2018. The Antinomies of 
Serendipity. How to Cognitively Frame Serendipity for 
Scientific Discoveries, Topoi, DOI: 10.1007/s11245-018-9571-3 
Avin, S.  2015a. Breaking the Grant Cycle: On the Rational Allocation of 
Public Resources to Scientific Research Projects (Doctoral 
dissertation, University of Cambridge). Accessed December 15, 
2017. https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/
1810/247434/phd_disser ta t ion_f ina l_for_pr in t .pdf?
sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
______  2015b. Funding Science by Lottery. In Recent Developments in 
the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki, eds. U. Mäki, I. 
Votsis, S. Ruphy and G. Schurz, 111-126. Basel: Springer 
International Publishing. 
______  2018. Policy Considerations for Random Allocation of Research 





Baccini, A. 2016. Napoléon et l'évaluation Bibliométrique de la 
Recherche: Considérations sur la Réforme de l'Université et sur 
l'Action de l'Agence Nationale d'évaluation en Italie. Canadian 
Journal of Information and Library Science 40(1): 37-57. 
Balietti, S., Mäs, M. and Helbing, D. 2015. On Disciplinary 
Fragmentation and Scientific progress. PloS one 10(3): 
e0118747. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0118747 
Banfi, A. and De Nicolao, G. 2013. Valutare Senza Sapere. Come Salvare 
la Valutazione della Ricerca in Italia da chi Pretende di Usarla 
Senza Conoscerla. Aut Aut 360: 43-68. 
Berezin, A. 1998. The Perils of Centralized Research Funding 
Systems. Knowledge, Technology & Policy 11(3): 5-26. 
Bonaccorsi, A. 2015. La Valutazione Possibile. Teoria e Pratica nel 
Mondo della Ricerca. Bologna: Il Mulino. 
____________  2018. Towards an Epistemic Approach to Evaluation in 
SSH. The Evaluation of Research in Social Sciences and 
Humanities, ed. A. Bonaccorsi, 1-29. Cham: Springer. 
Braun, D. 1998. The Role of Funding Agencies in the Cognitive 
Development of Science. Research policy 27(8): 807-821. 
Castellani, T., Pontecorvo, E. and Valente, A. 2016. Epistemic 
Consequences of Bibliometrics-based Evaluation: Insights from 
the Scientific Community. Social Epistemology 30(4): 1-22. 
Cimini, G., Gabrielli, A. and Labini, F. S. 2014. The Scientific 
Competitiveness of Nations. PloS one 9(12), e113470. https://
doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0113470 
Clauset, A., Arbesman, S. and Larremore, D. B. 2015. Systematic 
Inequality and Hierarchy in Faculty Hiring Networks. Science 
Advances 1(1), e1400005. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.
1400005 
Collins, H. 1992. Changing Order: Replication and Induction in 
Scientific Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Combes, P. P., Linnemer, L., and Visser, M. 2008. Publish or peer-rich? 
The Role of Skills and Networks in Hiring Economics 
Professors. Labour Economics 15(3): 423-441. 
Dupré, J. 1993. The Disorder of Things. Metaphysical Foundations of the 
Disunity of Science. Cambridge and London: Harvard Press.  
74
Evaluation of Research(ers) and its Threat to Epistemic Pluralisms
!
Fernàndez Pinto, M. 2016. Economics Imperialism in Social 
Epistemology: A Critical Assessment. Philosophy of the Social 
Sciences 46(5): 443-472. 
Feyerabend, P. 1975. Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory 
of Knowledge. Bristol: New Left Books. 
Fleck, L. 1979. Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. (Original: Entstehung und 
Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache: Einführung in 
die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkolektiv, 1935) 
Fodor, J. A. 1974. Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a 
Working Hypothesis). Synthese 28(2): 97-115. 
Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Geuna, A. and Piolatto, M. 2016. Research Assessment in the UK and 
Italy: Costly and Difficult, but Probably Worth It (at Least for a 
While). Research Policy 45(1): 260-271. 
Gillies, D. 2008. How should research be organised? London: College 
Publications. 
_______ 2014. Selecting Applications for Funding: Why Random Choice 
is Better than Peer Review. RT. A Journal on Research Policy 
and Evaluation 2(1). https://doi.org/10.13130/2282-5398/3834 
Godechot, O. 2016. The Chance of Influence: A Natural Experiment on 
the Role of Social Capital in Faculty Recruitment. Social 
Networks 46: 60-75. 
Goldman, A. I. 2011. A Guide to Social Epistemology. Social 
Epistemology: Essential Readings, eds. A. I. Goldman and D. 
Whitcomb, 11-37. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Hands, D. W. 1997. Caveat Emptor: Economics and Contemporary 
Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 64: S107-S116. 
Hicks, D. 2012. Performance-based University Research Funding 
Systems. Research Policy 41(2): 251-261. 
Kaiser, J. 2014. NIH Institute Considers Broad Shift to ‘People’ 
Awards. Science 345(6195): 366-367. 
Kellert, S. H., Longino, H. E. and Waters, C. K., eds. 2006. Scientific 




Kickert, W. 1995. Steering at a Distance: A New Paradigm of Public 
Governance in Dutch Higher Education. Governance 8(1): 
135-157. 
Kitcher, P. 1990. The Division of Cognitive Labor. The Journal of 
Philosophy 87(1): 5-22. 
_________  1993. The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, 
Objectivity without Illusion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kosso, P. 1989. Science and Objectivity. The Journal of 
Philosophy 86(5): 245-257. 
Kuhn, T. S. 1962/1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Ioannidis, J. P. 2005. Why Most Published Research Findings are 
False. PLos med 2(8): e124. https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pmed.0020124 
Lakatos, I. 1970. Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes. In Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, eds. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, 8-101. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Langfeldt, L. 2006. The Policy Challenges of Peer Review: Managing 
Bias , Conf l ic t of In teres ts and In terd isc ip l inary 
Assessments. Research Evaluation 15(1): 31-41. 
Laudan, L. 1977. Progress and its Problems: Towards a Theory of 
Scientific Growth. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press. 
Lee, F. S., Pham, X. and Gu, G. 2013. The UK Research Assessment 
Exercise and the Narrowing of UK Economics. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics 37(4): 693-717. 
Lee, C. J., Sugimoto, C. R., Zhang, G., and Cronin, B. 2013. Bias in Peer 
Review. Journal of the American Society for Information 
Science and Technology 64(1): 2-17. 
Luukkonen, T. 2012. Conservatism and Risk-Taking in Peer Review: 
Emerging ERC Practices. Research Evaluation 21(1): 48-60. 
Mahoney, M. J. 1977. Publication Prejudices: An Experimental Study of 
Confirmatory Bias in the Peer Review System. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research 1(2): 161-175.  
76
Evaluation of Research(ers) and its Threat to Epistemic Pluralisms
!
Mäki, U. 2005. Economic Epistemology: Hopes and Horrors. Episteme 
1(03): 211-222. 
Martini, C. and Pinto, M. F. 2017. Modeling the Social Organization of 
Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7(2): 
221-238. 
Merton, R. K. 1957. Priorities in Scientific Discovery: A Chapter in the 
Sociology of Science. American Sociological Review 22(6): 
635-659. 
Muldoon, R. and Weisberg, M. 2011. Robustness and Idealization in 
Models of Cognitive Labor. Synthese 183(2): 161-174. 
Oppenheim, P. and Putnam, H. 1958. Unity of Science as a Working 
Hypothesis. In Concepts, Theories and the Mind-Body Problem. 
Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. II., eds. H. 
Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell, 3-36. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Osterloh, M. and Frey, B. S. 2015. Ranking Games. Evaluation Review 
39(1): 102-129. 
Peirce, Charles S. 1879. Note on the Theory of the Economy of Research. 
In Report of the Superintendent of the United States Coast 
Survey Showing the Progress of the Work for the Fiscal Year 
Ending with June 1876, 197-201. Washington DC: US 
Government Printing Office. 
Pinto, V. 2012. Valutare e Punire. Una Critica alla Cultura della 
Valutazione. Napoli: Cronopio. 
Polanyi, M. 1966. The Tacit Dimension. London: Routledge. 
Smith, R. 2006. Peer Review: A Flawed Process at the Heart of Science 
and Journals. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 99(4): 
178-182. 
Stanford, P. K. 2015. Unconceived Alternatives and Conservatism in 
Science: The Impact of Professionalization, Peer-Review, and 
B i g S c i e n c e . S y n t h e s e . h t t p s : / / d o i . o rg / 1 0 . 1 0 0 7 /
s11229-015-0856-4 
Strevens, M. 2003. The Role of the Priority rule in Science. The Journal 
of Philosophy 100(2): 55-79. 
__________ 2013. Herding and the Quest for Credit. Journal of 




Suppes, P. 1978. The Plurality of Science. In PSA: Proceedings of the 
Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol. 
1978, 3-16. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Sylos Labini, F. 2016. Science and the Economic Crisis: Impact on 
Science, Lessons from Science. Basel: Springer International 
Publishing. 
Travis, G. D. L. and Collins, H. M. 1991. New Light on Old Boys: 
Cognitive and Institutional Particularism in the Peer Review 
System. Science, Technology & Human Values 16(3): 322-341. 
Viola, M. 2015. Some Remarks on the Division of Cognitive Labor. RT. A 
Journal on Research Policy and Evaluation, 3(1). https://
doi.org/10.13130/2282-5398/4768 
Wang, Q. and Sandström, U. 2015. Defining the Role of Cognitive 
Distance in the Peer Review Process with an Explorative Study 
of a Grant Scheme in Infection Biology. Research Evaluation 
24(3): 271-281. 
Weisberg, M. 2013. Modeling Herding Behavior and its Risks. Journal of 
Economic Methodology 20(1): 6-18. 
Weisberg, M. and Muldoon, R. 2009. Epistemic Landscapes and the 
Division of Cognitive Labor*. Philosophy of Science 76(2): 
225-252. 
Whitley, R. 2007. Changing Governance of the Public Sciences: The 
Consequences of Establishing Research Evaluation Systems for 
Knowledge Production in Different Countries and Scientific 
Fields. In The changing Governance of the Sciences: The 
Advent of Research Evaluation Systems, eds. R.  Whitley and J. 
Gläser, 3-30. Dodrecht: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Whitley, R. and Gläser, J., eds. 2007. The Changing Governance of the 
Sciences: The Advent of Research Evaluation Systems. 
Dodrecht: Springer Science & Business Media. 
Zamora Bonilla, Jesus P. 2012. The Economics of Scientific Knowledge. 
In Handbook of the Philosophy of Science. The Philosophy of 
Economics, ed. U. Mäki, 823-862. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Zollman, K. J. 2010. The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity. 
Erkenntnis 72(1): 17-35. 
Zinovyeva, N. and Bagues, M. 2015. The Role of Connections in 
Academic Promotions. American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics 7(2): 264-292.
78
